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ARGUING WITH FRIENDS
William Baude* & Ryan D. Doerfler**
Judges sometimes disagree about the best way to resolve a case. But the con-
ventional wisdom is that they should not be too swayed by such disagreement 
and should do their best to decide the case by their own lights. An emerging 
critique questions this view, arguing instead for widespread humility. In the 
face of disagreement, the argument goes, judges should generally concede 
ambiguity and uncertainty in almost all contested cases. 
Both positions are wrong. Drawing on the philosophical concepts of “peer 
disagreement” and “epistemic peerhood,” we argue for a different approach: 
A judge ought to give significant weight to the views of others, but only when 
those others share the judge’s basic methodology or interpretive outlook—i.e., 
only when those others are methodological “friends.” Thus textualists should 
hesitate before disagreeing with other textualists, and pragmatists should hes-
itate before disagreeing with like-minded pragmatists. Disagreement between 
the two camps is, by contrast, “old news” and so provides neither camp addi-
tional reason for pause.
We also suggest that judges should give weight to the views of all of their 
methodological friends, not just judges. And we suggest, even more tentative-
ly, that our proposal may explain and, to some extent, justify the seemingly 
ideological clusters of justices on the Supreme Court. The most productive 
disagreements, we think, are ones that come from arguing with friends.
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Introduction 
In our legal system, judges decide appeals in groups. How should that 
affect their views about the law? 
The conventional wisdom (unquestioned until recently) is that it should 
not. Each judge should consider the case by his or her own lights—looking 
to text, history, precedent, practicality, or whatever those lights dictate—and 
announce this vote to colleagues. If other judges disagree and vote different-
ly, that should not shake one’s confidence or change one’s behavior. A little 
bit of compromising around the edges might be permissible to write an 
opinion that can command a majority, but in the main, each judge is entitled 
to stick to his or her guns in the face of disagreement. But this view, some-
times labeled “solipsistic,”1 has recently come under attack.  
Several scholars now advocate a bracingly contrary position. Professors 
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that all judges ought to become 
more humble in the face of just about any disagreement with other judges. 
Presumptively, they maintain, when judges learn that their colleagues disa-
gree with them about interpreting a legal provision, they ought to conclude, 
at a minimum, that the provision’s meaning is unclear.2 Under existing doc-
trines conditional on legal clarity, they argue, this presumption should push 
judges toward deference to agencies, toward officer immunity from constitu-
tional torts, and toward solicitude for criminal defendants under the rule of 
lenity.3 Similarly, Professor Alex Stein argues that the solipsistic view is 
 1. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 Geo. L.J. 159, 159 
(2016). 
 2. Id. at 162; see also Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 541, 600–01 (2017) (endorsing this argument); F.E. Guerra-Pujol, The Case for Bayesian 
Voting: A Response to Posner & Vermeule, SSRN (Jan. 8, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3096881 [https://perma.cc/22Q4-Z4MR] (emphasizing that judges should take into account 
their own and their peers’ degrees of confidence). 
 3. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 159–60. Posner and Vermeule assume that the 
doctrines in question have to do with the clarity of the law, which we will accept for present 
purposes.  
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“fundamentally incompatible with the epistemological principles of rational 
fact-finding.”4 This emerging critique, which we will call “judicial concilia-
tionism”—for the reason that it instructs judges to react in a conciliatory 
fashion almost whenever encountering judicial disagreement—makes a 
powerful point against the status quo.  
The current debate, however, represents something of a false dichotomy. 
We propose a different approach, one that is supported both by common 
sense and by a more nuanced application of the “epistemological principles” 
invoked by one of these judicial conciliationists. In particular, we think it is a 
mistake to assume that all judges must treat one another alike, rather than 
recognizing consistent differences between some groups of judges. And it is 
a related mistake to assume that only other judges’ views should be consid-
ered. 
Instead, we argue, much turns on the question of legal methodology, ra-
ther than legal status. Judges ought to focus on the votes of those who share 
their interpretive methodology, approach, or outlook—who we call their 
methodological “friends.” Moreover, we suggest that judges should look to 
all of their methodological friends who have studied the case and express a 
firm view about it—judges on other courts, lawyers, professors—and not just 
to their immediate colleagues. Rather than looking to the votes of “other 
judges,” judges ought to look to the votes of their methodological friends.  
This analysis is also grounded in formal epistemology and provides oc-
casion to develop the important concepts of “peer disagreement” and “epis-
temic peers” in the context of legal interpretation. Philosophers’ study of 
epistemology provides several important insights about when and how it is 
rational for one to change one’s mind after learning that others disagree. We 
deploy those concepts here, arguing that they place great emphasis on dis-
putes over methodology.  
Finally, we note that these decisionmaking principles may have been 
hiding in plain sight. If judges do give substantial weight to the votes of their 
methodological friends, we would expect to see clusters of like-minded judg-
es whose votes tend to align with one another, and with certain academics 
and interest groups who follow the cases. As it happens, many observers 
have documented exactly this phenomenon on the Supreme Court today.5 
But while those observers have generally attributed such clustering to poli-
tics, our account provides the potential for a more charitable, and more law-
driven, explanation. 
The rest of this Essay proceeds through these three points. In Part I, we 
apply both common sense and formal epistemology to argue that judges 
ought to heavily weigh only the views of their methodological friends. In 
Part II, we extend those arguments to suggest, albeit more tentatively, that 
 4. Alex Stein, Law and the Epistemology of Disagreement, 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3070697 
[https://perma.cc/WEQ3-R9AY]. 
 5. See infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
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judges presumptively ought to consider all of their friends, regardless of 
whether or not they are judges. Finally, in Part III, we consider the implica-
tions of these conclusions and the judicial behavior they explain.
I. Judicial Friends
The intuition that judges ought to consider one another’s views is a 
powerful and sensible one, and one with a strong philosophical pedigree. But 
an important question remains: How? In our view, the answer starts with a 
key distinction that the judicial conciliationists do not accept. That distinc-
tion is between other judges who share their own methodology, orientation, 
or approach, and those who do not. As a matter of both common sense and 
more rigorous epistemology, judges ought to give far more weight to the 
votes of other judges who share their approach, who we call their “friends.”
By contrast there is little reason to give much weight to judges with very dif-
ferent approaches, who we call their “foes.”
A. Understanding Epistemic Peers
The argument for moderation in the face of disagreement starts with a 
powerful, motivating scenario. Imagine a group of justices sitting at confer-
ence table after oral argument, surprised to discover that they are deeply di-
vided: 
[F]ive Justices say that the ordinary meaning of the statute is clearly X, and 
four say that it is clearly Y. Each camp is astonished to hear the other 
camp’s view. Each is astonished to hear that the other camp not only fails to 
realize that (X or Y) is the clear meaning, but actually, and quite perversely, 
believes that instead (Y or X) is not only one possible reading, but is actual-
ly the clear meaning.6
In this scenario, Posner and Vermeule declare, “all nine Justices need a 
stiff dose of epistemic humility.”7 They argue, quite plausibly, that the justic-
es here ought to moderate their views based upon their respective discover-
ies, becoming much less confident that they are right about what the statute 
means. “If other colleagues, who are presumptively reasonable, agree that the 
statute is clear, but believe that it is clear in precisely the opposite direction,”
they reason, “it would be indefensible epistemic practice to simply ignore 
their views.”8
6. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 163.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 164.
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So far, so good. Indeed, this position fits into a more general philosophi-
cal literature on the phenomenon of “peer disagreement.”9 This philosophi-
cal literature turns out to provide a useful lens for examining disputes about 
legal interpretation. Because that literature is new to legal interpretation 
scholarship, we must first beg the reader’s patience to introduce the key 
terms: peer disagreement and epistemic peers.
Peer disagreement is a dispute between “epistemic peers,”10 those who 
are equal in a certain sense. In particular, epistemic peers are individuals 
who are equally likely to get things right (or wrong) with respect to a given 
issue.11 Generally speaking, two people are epistemic peers as to some issue 
when they are (1) equally rational and (2) have access to the same evidence.12
For instance, two expert meteorologists issuing forecasts on the basis of the 
same meteorological data, or two expert linguists looking at the same text, 
are likely to be epistemic peers. By contrast, a lawyer explaining a complicat-
ed legal situation to his client, or an eyewitness describing a scene to some-
body who was not there, are not.13
A natural instinct in response to peer disagreement is that the two peers 
ought to try to reconcile their beliefs. In particular, if one learns that an epis-
temic peer disagrees, one ought to have reduced confidence in one’s own po-
sition. In the literature on peer disagreement this position is known as “con-
ciliationism.”14
The instinct for conciliationism is easiest to see in cases of an easily falsi-
fiable disagreement. To take an example from the literature:
9. See generally David Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of 
Controversy, 4 Phil. Compass 756 (2009) [hereinafter Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence]
(surveying philosophical literature).
10. See, e.g., Hilary Kornblith, Belief in the Face of Controversy, in Disagreement 29, 31 
(Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield eds., 2010) [hereinafter Kornblith, Belief in the Face of 
Controversy].
11. See Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, 41 Noûs 478, 487 (2007) [hereinafter 
Elga, Reflection and Disagreement] (“[Y]ou count your friend as an epistemic peer—you think 
that she is about as good as you at judging the claim.”). And though a true peer is a true equal, 
peerhood can also be a matter of degree. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
12. See Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, in 1 Oxford Studies 
in Epistemology 167, 168 n.2 (Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne eds., 2005) [herein-
after Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement]; Christensen, Disagreement as Evi-
dence, supra note 9, at 756–57 (characterizing an epistemic peer as “one’s (at least approxi-
mate) equal in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, freedom from bias, etc.”). But 
see Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 499 n.21 (explaining why such factors 
are best understood as rough proxies).
13. Though we focus on the well-developed concept of peer disagreement, similar 
points have been made occasionally in other areas of philosophy as well. See, e.g., Dagfinn 
Føellesdal, Indeterminacy of Translation and Under-Determination of the Theory of Nature, 27 
Dialectica 289, 298 (1973).
14. See Adam Elga, How to Disagree About How to Disagree, in Disagreement, supra
note 10, at 175, 175 [hereinafter Elga, How to Disagree About How to Disagree]; Christensen, 
Disagreement as Evidence, supra note 9, at 757.
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Suppose that five of us go out to dinner. It’s time to pay the check, so the 
question we’re interested in is how much we each owe. We can all see the 
bill total clearly, we all agree to give a 20 percent tip, and we further agree 
to split the whole cost evenly, not worrying over who asked for imported 
water, or skipped [dessert], or drank more of the wine. I do the math in my 
head and become highly confident that our shares are $43 each. Mean-
while, my friend does the math in her head and becomes highly confident 
that our shares are $45 each.15
Here, conciliationism is common sense. One of us is in the right, and if we 
are equally rational and proceeding on the same evidence, then it is equally 
likely that it could be you, or me.16 Thus, goes conciliationism, it is equally 
likely that the correct calculation is either $43 or $45, so I should significant-
ly reduce my confidence that $43 is right.17
The philosophy of tip calculation may seem trivial, as well as academic, 
because with a little bit of time and basic arithmetic we can check the results 
by hand and learn whose guess was right rather than assign them equal 
weight.18 But conciliationism extends further, to differences in perceptual 
15. David Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News, 116 Phil. Rev.
187, 193 (2007) [hereinafter Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement]; see also Stein, supra
note 4, at 5 (adapting this example).
16. Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 15, at 193. For this reason, 
conciliationism is sometimes referred to as the “equal weight” view. E.g., Thomas Kelly, Peer 
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence, in Disagreement, supra note 10, at 111, 112 [here-
inafter Kelly, Peer Disagreement] (describing the “equal weight” view as the view that “[i]n cas-
es of peer disagreement, one should give equal weight to the opinion of a peer and to one’s own 
opinion”). Much of our analysis would likely hold true on weaker assumptions, so long as one 
agrees that the views of a peer are owed significant weight.
17. Arguments for conciliationism are thus similar to, but distinct from, Robert Au-
mann’s famous proof that two rational agents with shared priors but different conclusions as to 
some event will ultimately converge as their posteriors become “common knowledge.” See
Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 Annals Stat. 1236 (1976). Aumann’s agreement 
theorem assumes that both sides process information identically (and correctly), and on this 
assumption their disagreement must be because they have different information. As their dif-
fering views become common knowledge, each infers that the other has private information, in 
turn adjusts her view, and thus indirectly takes that private information into account. This 
process repeats again and again until both sides ultimately converge. Id. at 1238. Cases of peer 
disagreement fix a different assumption—it is assumed that the information available to both 
sides is the same, such that the disagreement can only be owed to a failure by one or both in 
information processing. See Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, supra note 12, at 
176 (“Disagreement among epistemic peers then, is disagreement among those who disagree 
despite having been exposed to the same evidence. Thus, our question concerns a case which 
stands outside the range of cases for which Aumann’s result holds.”). Judicial disagreement 
generally involves judges reaching different conclusions “based on the same sources and argu-
ments,” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 159–60, so peer disagreement, rather than Au-
mann’s theorem, is a better match.
18. See David Christensen, Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism,
11 Philosophers’ Imprint, no. 6, 2011, at 8–11, http://www.philosophersimprint.org/011006/
[https://perma.cc/GWM6-AW5X] [hereinafter Christensen, Disagreement, Question-Begging 
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judgment as well. For instance, most philosophers agree that mutually re-
duced confidence is appropriate in the following scenario as well:
You and I are traffic cops watching the cars pass on Main Street. We are 
equally good, equally attentive cops, with equally reliable eyesight. We see a 
truck pass through the intersection. I think that it ran the red light. You 
think it got through on yellow.19
Now to be sure, conciliationism is subject to various objections. One is 
that the position is self-defeating: Insofar as numerous intelligent, well-
informed philosophers reject conciliationism, how can it be rational for con-
ciliationists to hold steadfast in their conciliationism?20 Another concern is 
that conciliationism, if true, would lead to rampant skepticism. As one phi-
losopher puts it, “[t]he worry is that there is a lot of disagreement out there: 
if it is epistemically significant, then it will turn out that we aren’t rational in 
believing much of anything.”21 This concern might seem especially warrant-
ed once we move beyond epistemically settled zones like math and eyesight 
to domains such as morality, religion, or politics.22
We think that conciliationism can withstand these objections if it is 
properly understood.23 The key, however, is to understand that coming to 
regard someone as an epistemic peer is not as easy as it might seem. And this 
means that, in the legal context, not all judges should necessarily regard all 
other judges as epistemic peers.24 In our view, the judicial conciliationist ap-
proach—that is, the position that calls for conciliation among all judges 
simply because they are judges—neglects a key distinction, namely the role 
of judicial outlook or methodology. Not all judges share the same outlook, 
and these disagreements in outlook are a foundation of divided votes. Un-
derstanding these disagreements is key to applying the concept of peer disa-
greement to legal interpretation.
and Epistemic Self-Criticism] (discussing cases in which the disputants each check their math 
carefully).
19. Katia Vavova, Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism, 28 Phil. Persp. 302, 307 
(2014) [hereinafter Vavova, Moral Disagreement].
20. See, e.g., Brian Weatherson, Disagreements, Philosophical, and Otherwise, in The 
Epistemology of Disagreement 54, 55 (David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey eds., 2013).
21. Katia Vavova, Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement, 79 Erkenntnis (Supple-
ment) 173, 182 (2014) [hereinafter Vavova, Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement].
22. See, e.g., Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 15, at 189; Korn-
blith, Belief in the Face of Controversy, supra note 10, at 33.
23. Most of the arguments here go to the concern that accepting conciliationism would 
lead to rampant skepticism. As to the argument that conciliationism is self-defeating, see Elga, 
How to Disagree About How to Disagree, supra note 14, at 184–86.
24. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 39 (2013) (“The relationship that creates epistemic authority might be 
viewed as dyadic—a relationship between a pair consisting of the possible epistemic authority 
and the individual who might defer to the epistemic authority. A given lower court judge, say 
Learned Hand, might not view a given Supreme Court Justice, say Tom Clark, as an epistemic 
authority or even as an epistemic peer or equal.”).
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In particular, we think that two judges ought to consider one another 
“epistemic peers” only to the extent that they share the same judicial outlook 
or methodology. This shared approach to judging is what marks the judges 
as “equally rational” from each other’s point of view and committed to look-
ing to the “same evidence.”25 The philosophical label may be slightly unfor-
tunate, because it seems impolitic to label another judge “irrational” in the 
colloquial sense, but the substance is a square match. 
In substance, interpretive disputes are disputes about what things to 
look at, and what to do with those things.26 Judges who converge on those 
points are epistemic peers in the technical sense; judges who dispute them 
are not—or at least not so far as either can tell.27 Even if one would not call a 
methodological foe “irrational” or “unreasonable” in the colloquial sense, 
one might candidly say that this otherwise capable, intelligent person is re-
peatedly and predictably mistaken when interpreting statutes.
With methodology more firmly in view, we can now see that something 
important was elided from the original motivating scenario for judicial con-
ciliationism—the surprising vote at conference. Why were the judges sur-
prised by their disagreement? Consider two variants on the original scenario:
At the conference after oral argument, one judge, a conservative textualist, 
says that the meaning of the statute is clearly X. She reasons that X is the 
only interpretation that squares with ordinary usage of the language at is-
sue. A second judge, also a conservative textualist, says that the meaning is 
clearly Y. She also claims to be moved primarily by ordinary language ex-
amples, albeit examples that come out the other way. Each judge is aston-
ished to hear the other’s view.
Or alternatively:
At the conference after oral argument, one judge, a conservative textualist, 
says that the meaning of the statute is clearly X. She reasons that X is the 
only interpretation that squares with ordinary usage of the language at is-
sue. A second judge, a liberal purposivist, says that it is clearly Y. She ex-
plains that Y is the only interpretation that is compatible with Congress’s
apparent policy aim. Each is dismayed but unsurprised to hear the other’s
view.
Whether as a matter of formal epistemology or common sense, there is 
an important difference between these two scenarios. In the first case, the 
judges have learned something important from their disagreement and 
should become much less confident in their respective readings of the stat-
ute. In the second case, by contrast, the judges have learned nothing new 
from one another and have little reason to update their views.
25. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
26. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv. L. Rev.
1079, 1112–18 (2017).
27. See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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What should be important is not simply the presence of disagreement 
but what judges learn from it. As judicial conciliationists emphasize again 
and again, the whole rationale for judges updating their beliefs on the basis 
of the votes of other judges is that those votes contain “information” that 
those judges did not already have.28 Indeed, this point is built into the origi-
nal scenario’s emphasis that the justices involved are “astonished” to learn of 
the imagined disagreement.29
A disagreement between those who share a methodology—between 
methodological “friends”—involves the discovery of something new. One 
learns that one’s own methodology might lead to a different result in the case 
at hand. By contrast, a disagreement between those with opposed methodol-
ogies—methodological “foes”—pretty much comes as “old news” to the par-
ties involved.30
Start with the case of methodological friends. In that scenario, both 
judges see eye to eye on how to interpret statutes. Their jurisprudential and 
interpretive methodological commitments are the same. To the extent that 
other attitudes inform legal interpretation, those attitudes are in alignment 
too.31 (With the judges as longtime colleagues, we can assume that they 
know about this convergence as well.) Given these similarities, and given 
that each has access to the same briefs and legal materials, each judge would 
predict that the other would interpret the statute the same way. And each 
would be even firmer in this prediction once determining that its meaning is 
clear.32
Against the backdrop of these predictions, the two friends’ diverging in-
terpretations would be incredibly surprising to each. Previously, each 
thought their shared interpretive methodology yielded a clear answer in this 
case. Now, each judge learns that one of them is quite wrong. Each is left to 
wonder which of the two of them was the one who applied the methodology 
incorrectly. It is likely, and rational, for each judge to reconsider with dimin-
ished confidence because they should have reached the same result.
Now consider the case of methodological foes. There, the two judges are 
utterly at odds about how to interpret statutes, and, again, as longtime col-
leagues they presumably know about this longstanding dispute. For that rea-
son, neither would have a great deal of confidence in the first place that the 
other would interpret the statute the same way. The other judge will be look-
ing at different materials, or looking at them in a different way, so it will be 
little surprise if they come out with a different answer in the end. As each 
28. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 159–60; Stein, supra note 4, at 33.
29. Posner & Vermuele, supra note 1, at 163.
30. Vavova, Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement, supra note 21, at 181.
31. As we explain below, even if nonlegal normative attitudes are irrelevant to interpre-
tation, ideological alignment is plausibly still relevant to the determination of whether another 
is an epistemic peer with respect to statutory interpretation. See infra Section I.B.
32. If, by contrast, each had a confidence level just higher than 0.5, each would presum-
ably have only limited confidence that the other would come out the same way.
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considers the arguments in isolation, each would start to predict that the 
other would disagree, recognizing that, for example, ordinary usage points 
one way and apparent purpose another. And, at conference, when their disa-
greement is revealed, each would respond with a sigh: “Yet another case 
where the wrong methodology produces the wrong result.”33
To summarize: Because disagreements between methodological foes are
unsurprising,34 the rediscovery of such disagreements reveals little infor-
mation to the parties involved and so provides little reason for those parties 
to change their beliefs. By contrast, when methodological friends disagree, 
they should be more surprised and so have more to learn. This gives them 
more reason to update their beliefs.35 Disagreement between methodological 
foes is more like a tip disagreement between a skinflint and a spendthrift: 
neither is surprised because they were always bound to disagree. 
We have stylized the disagreement between friends and foes by consid-
ering only two polar cases. In reality, judicial views may lie on a spectrum, 
with more similar judges being more “friendly” in the methodological sense, 
and more dissimilar judges being more adversarial. For that reason, the true 
implications of our argument are scalar rather than binary: the more similar 
two judges are in their interpretive methodologies, the more reason they 
have to reduce their confidence in the face of disagreement.36 But the stylized 
description demonstrates the key point: the centrality of methodology.
B. Immediate Objections
Defenders of judicial conciliationism do anticipate that some readers 
will insist on the importance of methodology. The defenders deploy three 
33. To be fair, judges might learn something from their foes’ votes—such as what the 
opposing methodology requires in this case, or how committed one’s foes are to following their 
inferior methodology. To the extent that judges engage in a sort of continual reflective-
equilibrium process to evaluate interpretive methodologies, cf. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Arguing 
in Good Faith About the Constitution: Ideology, Methodology, and Reflective Equilibrium, 84 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 123, 123–25 (2017), this information might have a little bit of influence on the 
margin. But we doubt that any particular case provides an effect of real significance. Cf. Cass R. 
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 299–
300 (2017) (describing “the sign fallacy,” viz: “to identify the likely sign of an effect and then to 
declare victory, without examining its magnitude—without asking whether it is realistic to 
think that the effect will be significant”).
34. Unsurprising, that is, given the context. There is a wider frame in which judicial dis-
agreement is always surprising because most applications of the law are easy and obvious. See
Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1227 (2009).
35. In Bayesian terms, disagreement between methodological foes could best be de-
scribed as a difference in priors. Cf. Aumann, supra note 17 (arguing only that rational agents 
with shared priors will converge in their posteriors) and accompanying discussion.
36. See, e.g., Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 478–79 (“There are ex-
perts and gurus, people to whom we should defer entirely. There are fakes and fools, who 
should be ignored. In between, there are friends and other advisors (including our own future 
and past selves), whose opinions should guide us in a less than fully authoritative way.”).
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preemptive responses: first, an argument that judges ought to display the 
same epistemic doubts at the level of their own methodology; second, an ar-
gument that different methodologies overlap so much that there is no real 
methodological disagreement; and, third, an argument that judges are for-
mally required to treat one another as epistemic peers.37 None of these ar-
guments, we think, is really convincing.
1. Second-Order Humility
First, judicial conciliationists argue that the same principles of epistemic 
humility ought to apply to disagreements over methodology itself—that the 
fact of methodological judicial disagreement ought to weaken judges’ confi-
dence in their own methodologies. This is second-order epistemic humility. 
As Posner and Vermeule explain:
On our view, epistemic humility should extend to the meta-level as well, at 
least presumptively. All nine Justices should recognize that reasonable 
minds can disagree about the proper approach to interpretation, at least 
within conventional boundaries that comfortably include self-identified 
texualists, self-identified purposivists, self-identified intentionalists, and 
various hybrids.38
Just as judges should become less confident in specific interpretations upon 
learning that other judges interpret the same text differently, so too might 
judges be less confident in their preferred interpretive theory once acknowl-
edging that other judges find different theories persuasive.
There is some intuitive force to this argument.39 After all, why should 
there be anything magical about interpretive methodologies that exempt 
them from normal principles of epistemic humility? If nobody else is a pure-
hearted originalist, should that not make the stout-hearted originalist worry 
that he is doing something wrong?40 To the extent that we have methodolog-
ical commitments or outlooks, many of us have formed them through ongo-
ing discussion and give-and-take with others. So perhaps the continuing 
presence of others who disagree with us should shake our faith in our own 
methodological commitments.
Despite this intuitive force, we do not think second-order humility is 
appropriate when judging particular cases. At conference, when judges hear 
that some of their colleagues do not share their interpretive approach, they 
37. Posner and Vermeule do allow that “it is possible that judges should disregard the 
votes of other judges based on those judges’ reasons” but only under conditions that they “sus-
pect . . . are rarely satisfied.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 181–82.
38. Id. at 166.
39. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 601 n.294 (endorsing second-order humility argument).
40. On pure-hearted originalism, see Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 864 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil]. On the 
relative prevalence of commitment to more and less pure forms of originalism, see generally 
William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349 (2015).
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are hearing “old news” (at least after the first few times the judges sit togeth-
er). With no new information, there is no reason for judges to update their 
views about the case.
This argument was implicit in our discussion above of methodological 
foes. Disagreement with one’s methodological foes is a nonevent, epistemi-
cally speaking, because such disagreement is old news to both sides. The 
same is just as true for second-order humility. It is precisely because those 
parties are aware of each other’s methodological positions that the specific 
disagreements between them are unsurprising.
This is not to deny that second-order humility could have a place in 
reaching one’s own methodological views; this just denies that the place is 
the judicial conference table. By the time lawyers become judges, they are al-
ready well aware of different legal methodologies—they may even have be-
come aware of them back in law school, before they were lawyers. Moreover, 
those judges have doubtless been reminded of those disagreements through-
out their careers. Justices Scalia and Breyer relived their methodological dis-
agreements every time they took their act on tour.41 As such, judges have had 
ample opportunity to rationally update themselves on the basis of those fun-
damental disputes. Hearing, one more time, that their colleagues have a dif-
ferent approach tells them nothing new. Whatever degree of second-order 
humility is appropriate should already be baked into their views.42
There are also more fundamental philosophical arguments against sec-
ond-order humility, namely that it pushes conciliationism beyond its con-
ceptual limits. As philosopher Adam Elga has observed, conciliationism does 
not apply to instances of “deep” or fundamental disagreement.43 The reason 
is that “if a disagreement goes deep enough . . . there is little or no independ-
ent ground from which to evaluate our respective epistemic credentials,” i.e.,
no way to determine whether the person with whom one disagrees is in fact 
one’s epistemic peer.44
To see why, it is important to remember that epistemic peerhood re-
quires us to step outside of the individual disagreement we are evaluating. A 
naive response to peer disagreement would be to automatically deny that an-
ybody who disagrees with us can be a peer: “I thought that we were both rel-
atively observant, but now that I hear you deny that the truck ran the red 
light, I see you cannot be trusted!”45 But this response is obviously question 
41. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Breyer and Scalia Take Their Road Show Inside, The BLT
(Mar. 24, 2010, 10:51 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/03/breyer-scalia-take-their-
road-show-inside.html [https://perma.cc/JS2C-MDLU].
42. Here it is worth noting that versions of conciliationism that call for dramatically 
reduced confidence in the face of persistent, deep disagreement, see supra notes 39–41 and ac-
companying text, are a great deal more revisionary than the one defended here.
43. Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 493–97.
44. Vavova, Moral Disagreement, supra note 19, at 319.
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for the red light example.
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begging.46 For the concept of an epistemic peer to do any work, peerhood 
must be “based on reasoning that is independent of the disputed issue.”47
Thus one’s determination whether another person is equally rational must 
be made setting aside this particular observation—based on track record, 
vantage point, or whatever else.48
All of this means that independent peer evaluation becomes unavailable 
when disagreement runs too deep. Elga imagines two friends at “opposite 
ends of the political spectrum” considering whether abortion is morally 
permissible.49 As Elga notes, even setting aside their disagreement about 
abortion, neither friend regards the other as her epistemic peer about politics 
or morality.50 Each friend considers the other to have a terrible track record 
when it comes to moral and political questions generally—as demonstrated 
by their disagreements about affirmative action, gun control, etc.—and so to 
be her epistemic inferior.51
One might be tempted to say that the two friends ought to “attend to the 
larger disagreement,” and set aside not only their reasoning about abortion, 
but about moral and political matters generally.52 But having set aside all of 
politics and morality, neither friend has any basis left upon which to judge 
whether the other is an epistemic peer as to the sorts of questions at issue.53
The question becomes: “Setting aside everything you think about morality 
and politics, do you think she is just as likely as you to get things right when 
it comes to morality and politics?” The reasonable response is: “I have no 
clue.”
46. See Christensen, Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism, supra
note 18, at 2.
47. Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 492 (emphasis omitted).
48. This “independence” principle—that one must assess epistemic peerhood on the 
basis of independent reasoning, Christensen, Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic 
Self-Criticism, supra note 18, at 1–2—is inherently intertwined with conciliationism, see Chris-
tensen, Disagreement as Evidence, supra note 9, at 758–61; Thomas Kelly, Disagreement and 
the Burdens of Judgment, in The Epistemology of Disagreement, supra note 20, at 31, 36–
37. Some philosophers largely reject conciliationism by objecting to this independence princi-
ple. See Kelly, Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment, supra, at 40–43; see also Kelly, Peer 
Disagreement, supra note 16, 122–35. Addressing those objections, however, goes beyond the 
scope of this Essay, which is focused on the implications of a broadly conciliationist approach 
for legal interpretation.
49. Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, supra note 11, at 492–93.
50. Id. at 493.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 495.
53. See id. at 496 (“To set aside [one’s] reasoning about all of these issues is to set aside a 
large and central chunk of her ethical and political outlook. Once so much has been set aside, 
there is no determinate fact about what opinion of [the other] remains.”); Vavova, Moral Disa-
greement, supra note 19, at 315 (“This suggests that there is an inverse relation between how 
confident I should be that you are my peer and how deep our disagreement goes. The deeper 
the disagreement, the less confident my evaluations of your epistemic credentials. And the less 
confident those evaluations, the less significant our disagreement can be.”).
332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:319
Elga’s reasoning provides reason to doubt second-order humility in the 
legal domain as well. If two methodological foes are asked to set aside only 
their disagreement about the case at hand, each one would deny that the 
other is an epistemic peer. Each one would conclude that the other has a ter-
rible track record when it comes to interpreting statutes generally. If each 
were instead asked to set aside not just their disagreement about the instant 
case, but about methodology in general, i.e., if the two were then to “attend 
to the larger disagreement,” neither would have any basis left upon which to 
assess her respective epistemic credentials. Thus, once again, neither judge 
would have reason to be less confident in her views.
This inability to assess is starkest in situations where judges regard each 
other’s methodology as incoherent or premised upon some fundamental 
misunderstanding.54 To be sure, second-order humility, like first-order hu-
mility, could be scalar rather than binary. We could imagine, for instance, a 
world where all judges were committed consequentialists with the same so-
cial welfare function, and their methodological disputes would be disagree-
ments about what methodology maximized social welfare.55 Or a world 
where all judges were committed legal positivists and their methodological 
disputes would be disagreements about the application of positivism to vari-
ous social facts.56 But even this kind of shared philosophy is probably too 
thin to generate useful peer assessments, just as two people cannot surmount 
deep moral disagreement simply by sharing basic human empiricism and 
logical reasoning.
Finally, advancing one step further into epistemological theory, we 
acknowledge a further possible counterargument: one might think that even 
if one cannot tell whether another person is an epistemic peer, having set 
aside all of one’s theoretical commitments, one also cannot rule it out, and 
that that alone should be enough to trigger epistemic humility.57 In other 
words, maybe reduced confidence is the right response to disagreement ab-
sent evidence of another’s epistemic inferiority.58 But as philosopher Katia 
54. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of In-
terpretation 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin 
Scalia, New Republic (Aug. 24, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-
reading-the-law-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/4TRW-2HNU].
55. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev.
636, 642 (1999).
56. Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 26, at 1140–47.
57. See, e.g., Nathan L. King, Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer Is Hard 
to Find, 85 Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 249, 268 (2012) (“[I]t is hard to see how one’s
belief that P can be rational if one considers, but withholds [judgment] concerning the claim 
that one’s total epistemic position renders one more likely to be correct than one’s dissent-
er . . . .”).
58. Philosopher Katia Vavova calls this thought the “No Independent Reason Princi-
ple.” Vavova, Moral Disagreement, supra note 19, at 316.
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Vavova explains, this position is too demanding. It ignores the important 
difference between being “faced with [affirmative] evidence of error” and be-
ing in a situation in which we merely lack evidence of absence of error.59 In 
part for that reason, it ultimately reduces to generic Cartesian skepticism.60
Without a non-question-begging response to the moral skeptic, for example, 
one would be just as obligated to revise one’s views in their directions as to-
ward someone who is obviously a genuine epistemic peer on normative 
questions, such as a close friend with a similar evaluative outlook. Thus, the 
more defensible view is the more modest view: one should revise one’s be-
liefs only if one has good reason to think that the other person is epistemical-
ly equal.61
Another way to think about these philosophical arguments is by analogy 
to “the principle of insufficient reason.”62 That principle instructs deci-
sionmakers to “assume[] that variables of unknowable importance, cutting 
in opposed directions, have equal values and thus systematically cancel 
out.”63 In other words, the principle of insufficient reason tells decisionmak-
ers to attend to considerations of known significance, to the exclusion of 
considerations of unknown significance. Here, the argument is that judges 
should attend to disagreements of known significance to the exclusion of 
disagreements of unknown significance, and, indeed, perhaps unknowable 
for the reasons Elga and Vavova articulate.64
In sum, second-order humility requires an incredibly demanding and 
somewhat implausible form of theoretical skepticism. The more plausible 
basis for peer disagreement is a principle requiring revision of one’s beliefs 
on the basis of disagreement only if one has reason to think that the person
with whom one disagrees is an epistemic peer. In the context of judging, this 
occurs, roughly speaking, only to the extent that the person with whom one 
disagrees is one’s jurisprudential friend.
2. Overlap in Interpretive Methodologies
Judicial conciliationists also suggest that the difference between main-
stream interpretive methodologies is not so great, making methodological 
disagreement relatively unimportant. Thus, according to Posner and Ver-
meule:
59. Id. at 318; see also id. at 314–15.
60. Id. at 321.
61. This one is the “Good Independent Reason Principle.” Id. at 317.
62. Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 173 (2006); see also David M. 
Kreps, Notes on the Theory of Choice 146 (1988).
63. Vermeule, supra note 62, at 173.
64. Attending to methodological friends and ignoring foes also meets Vermeule’s two 
proposed criteria that there be “a pronounced informational advantage” for the attended con-
sideration, and that the attended consideration be, at least “in some rough sense, of the same 
order of importance as the discarded imponderables.” Id. at 175.
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Schematically, it is not the case that textualist judges consider sources or 
arguments {A, B, C} while purposivist judges consider sources or argu-
ments {D, E, F}. Rather closer to the truth is a schema in which textualists 
consider {A, B, C} while purposivists consider {B, C, D}, or even {A, B, C, 
D}. There is a substantial overlap in the sources used by all the major camps 
of interpretive theory.65
And from this they infer:
This overlap of sources implies that judges in both camps will often gain 
relevant information—relevant even on their own theories—from observ-
ing the votes of other judges, even judges in other camps, insofar as those 
other judges are considering the same sources.66
We agree with Posner and Vermeule that textualists and purposivists 
consider many of the same sources (e.g., text, structure) when investigating 
statutory meaning, and may sometimes even share the same methods. Thus, 
we grant that methodological agreement is scalar rather than binary. But we 
do not think that a mere overlap in sources and methods causes adherents of 
different interpretive methodologies to learn much from the votes of their 
methodological foes.
We are not denying that judges might usefully learn from arguments
made by other judges during the course of an appeal. Those arguments can 
be taken on their own terms, run through one’s own methodological filter, 
and accepted or discarded. But judicial conciliationists argue that epistemic 
humility ought to come from other judges’ votes themselves. Yet these differ-
ing votes on the same interpretive sources are often caused precisely because 
of methodological differences. First, and most obvious, even if textualists 
and purposivists consider similar sources, the relative weight each assigns to 
those sources is quite different.67
Second, even if the evidence each considers is substantially similar, the 
object of inquiry for textualists and purposivists is potentially quite differ-
ent.68 If, for example, textualists are trying to determine “the import that a 
reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conven-
tions would attach to the enacted words,”69 while purposivists are seeking the 
reading that best advances “the statute’s goal,”70 the fact that similar sources 
65. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 167.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. 
L. Rev. 70, 92–96 (2006).
68. Baude & Sachs, supra note 26, at 1112–18.
69. John F. Manning, Essay, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 424 
(2005).
70. William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation
229 (2d ed. 2006) (“Purposivism sets the originalist inquiry at a higher level of generality. It 
asks, ‘What was the statute’s goal?’ rather than ‘What did the drafters specifically intend?’ ”).
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are relevant to each inquiry is beside the point. Both astronomers and astrol-
ogists look at the stars, but neither has much to learn from the other.
Even if there are some cases where textualism and purposivism fully 
overlap—i.e., where textualists and purposivists use the same evidence in the 
same way—it is not at all clear that judges can determine when this is the 
case. And, even if they can, it is not clear it is worth the effort. Reconsider a 
variation of our earlier scenarios:
At the conference after oral argument, one judge, a liberal purposivist, says 
that the meaning of the statute is clearly X. She reasons that X is the only 
interpretation that makes sense of the obvious purpose of the statute, and is 
also consistent with its ordinary meaning. A second judge, also a liberal 
purposivist, agrees. A third judge, a conservative textualist, says that the 
meaning is clearly Y. She argues that Y is simply what the ordinary mean-
ing of the statute requires.
In this scenario, there seems to be some methodological overlap, but it is 
hard for either of the purposivist judges to give much credit to the third 
judge’s vote and rationale. 
Perhaps, if the third judge does go to the trouble to insist that she would 
vote the same way even considering Congress’s apparent policy aim, that 
should spur the purposivists to give her vote some weight. Even so, this 
would require the third judge to be equally reliable at determining ordinary 
meaning, which there is some reason to doubt. The purposivists might rea-
sonably worry that the judge has an excessively wooden, dictionary-bound 
conception of ordinary usage, and that she is insufficiently attentive to lan-
guage’s sensitivity to practical context. Moreover, as discussed above, the 
third judge’s repeated insistence on interpreting statutes in the wrong way 
might cause them to doubt her statutory interpretation ability more general-
ly.71
It is conceivable that through sufficient inquiry and extensive conversa-
tion, the purposivist judges could figure out which is afoot in each case. But 
then again, maybe not. And at this point, we must ask: Why go through the 
hassle of an extensive interrogation with limited expected utility when each 
already has confirmation from a true epistemic peer that her initial interpre-
tation of the statute is correct?
As methodologies converge enough times, judges might come closer and 
closer to being methodological friends. But if their methodologies remain 
sufficiently distinct as to remain foes, then we doubt that they have much to 
learn from one another’s votes—even if textualists and purposivists do use 
overlapping methodologies. And, even if those votes could be mined for 
some information, it is highly questionable whether it is enough to be 
worthwhile. 
71. See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
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3. Institutional Peers
Finally, judicial conciliationists argue that judges must treat each other 
as epistemic peers because our legal system assigns them equal institutional 
authority. As Stein puts it:
[Our] system entrusts the power of making decisions about people’s rights, 
duties and liabilities and about the meanings of statutes and constitutions 
in the hands of equally informed and (more or less) equally competent de-
cision-makers: judges and jurors. These decision-makers function as epis-
temic peers.72
As his argument implies, Stein (sensibly) does not appear to think that 
judges in fact regard all other judges as epistemic peers.73 Rather, the claim is 
that, because judges enjoy the same legal status under our constitutional and 
statutory schemes, each is obligated to act as if the others are epistemic peers.
We think that Stein’s argument conflates institutional authority with ep-
istemic authority. More still, his position is at odds with the widely accepted 
judicial practice of criticizing the opinions of other judges on expressly 
methodological grounds.
Start with institutional, as opposed to epistemic, authority. Here, a help-
ful analogy is to citizen voting in public elections. Like judges, citizens enjoy 
equal democratic status under our constitutional and statutory schemes.74
The way these equal rights manifest is through the assignment of equal legal 
significance to each citizen’s vote. But is that enough? Does the principle of 
“one person, one vote” also require that citizens act as if all other citizens are 
epistemic peers on matters of politics?75 While greater respect among citi-
zens would benefit our politics greatly, it seems implausible to suggest that, 
as a legal (or perhaps ethical) matter, citizens are required to act—and, even 
more strongly, vote—as if the policy views of all other citizens are, in their 
view, equally plausible. So too, we argue, with judges. No one denies that 
judges must assign equal legal significance to the votes of other judges, ad-
justing for institutional hierarchy.76 Be that as it may, why think that, in ad-
dition, judges must act as if the reasoning of other judges is equally persua-
sive?
72. Stein, supra note 4, at 17 (emphasis added).
73. Hence the remark about judges being “(more or less) equally competent.” Id.
74. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
207 (1962).
75. Again, for the reasons above, we think citizens at opposite ends of the political spec-
trum have little reason to actually regard one another as epistemic peers. See supra notes 45–54
and accompanying text.
76. A conservative textualist judge on a court of appeals is, for example, no less bound 
by a Supreme Court decision supported by liberal purposivist majority than one supported by 
a conservative textualist majority.
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That judges need not maintain this pretense, especially when it comes to 
methodological disputes, is further supported by the wide acceptance of 
open methodological disagreement by judges. No one thinks, for example, 
that it is somehow inconsistent with his judicial role for Judge Katzmann to 
criticize other judges for ignoring the intricacies of the legislative process.77
Nor for Justice Breyer to insist that his originalist colleagues are interpreting 
the Constitution all wrong.78 Interestingly, wide acceptance of open method-
ological disagreement by judges contrasts sharply with, for example, open 
political disagreement. Contrary to Stein’s suggestion, this contrast between 
methodological and other forms of disagreement indicates that feigned 
methodological agnosticism is decidedly not compelled by a judge’s legal (or 
professional ethical) obligations.
C. Do Judges Really Have Methodologies?
One might also object that our proposal rests on a false assumption—
that judges indeed have well-defined methodologies to mark out their 
friends and foes. Indeed, Posner and Vermeule seem skeptical of this as-
sumption, remarking that “the controversies over interpretive theory that 
preoccupy academics do not necessarily carry over to judicial decision mak-
ing, which is often more pragmatic in spirit,”79 and that “many judges are 
not theoretical at all and just consider all sources and arguments in a sort of 
promiscuous jumble.”80 We are willing to defend the assumption in part, but 
our proposal does not really depend on it. It works just as well for judges 
who are pragmatic and impatient with interpretive theory. 
So we note in passing that some judges do seem to have self-consciously 
methodological disagreements with one another. Indeed, a number of recent 
judges have written about their methodologies, and sometimes sharply dis-
tinguished themselves from one another.81 And other judges nonetheless ob-
viously fall into methodological camps. One doesn’t need to be preoccupied 
with academic theory to recognize the difference between Justice Breyer and 
Justice Thomas. When Justice Breyer learns that Justice Thomas disagrees 
with him about the permissibility of an agency action or the viability of a 
77. See Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014).
78. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005).
79. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 181–82.
80. Id. at 167.
81. Compare, for instance, Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law
(2012), with Robert A. Katzmann, supra note 77, and Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory 
Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016) (reviewing Katzmann, supra note 77). Or com-
pare Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 800 (1983), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
533, 534 (1983). Or compare Antonin Scalia, supra note 54, at 37–47, and Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, supra note 40, with Breyer, supra note 78, and David H. Souter, Address, Har-
vard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 429 (2010).
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constitutional claim, he is less likely to be surprised, and less likely to recon-
sider his views, than if Justice Ginsburg disagrees with him instead. 
But even putting aside judges who have pronounced views on interpre-
tation, methodology can just be a general shorthand for the way judges think 
about deciding cases. A judge who takes an atheoretical, all-things-
considered approach to interpretation will learn little from the votes of a 
more single-track colleague (as we discuss above, that colleague’s vote con-
tains a little bit of information, but not much).82 By contrast, the same atheo-
retical judge will learn a lot more from the vote of a similarly atheoretical, 
all-things-considered colleague. If the similarly open-minded judge comes to 
a very different conclusion, one would rightly wonder whether one is miss-
ing something dispositive. 
Similarly, if two different camps of atheoretical judges have consistent 
differences between them—whether caused by political commitments, by 
considering different angles of the “promiscuous jumble,” or by whatever 
else—those different camps can be shorthanded as methodological. Nothing 
rides on whether the judges in those camps can describe their differences in 
theoretical terms or on whether they could get an “A” in a statutory interpre-
tation seminar.
Take, for instance, the very recent survey of appellate judges by Abbe 
Gluck and Richard Posner.83 While Gluck and Posner conclude that “the la-
bels ‘textualist’ and ‘purposivist’ [are] unhelpful in addressing the differences 
among the judges” they surveyed, their work still suggests consistent meth-
odological disagreements.84 They conclude that the judges they surveyed can 
be best divided into five categories—”Eclectic Textualists,” “Legal Process 
Institutionalists,” “Congressionalists,” “Post-Scalia Canonists,” and “D.C. 
Circuit Judges.”85 We do not necessarily endorse the authors’ survey meth-
odology or their definitions, but their work illustrates that one can have 
methodological camps without methodological labels or deep theory. 
In other words, our point about friends and foes holds regardless of 
terminology. One could describe judges as having methodologies, or general 
outlooks, or simply consistent patterns of behavior that are shared between 
some judges more often than between others. The point remains that judges 
learn a lot more from the votes of judges who reason like them than judges 
who regularly reason differently.
82. See supra Section I.B.2.
83. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the 
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 
(2018).
84. Id. at 1303.
85. Id. at 1303–05.
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D. Strategic Voting
Thus far, we have argued generally that, in areas beset by deep disa-
greement, one has reason to be less confident in one’s beliefs upon discover-
ing disagreement with one’s friends, but not with one’s foes. What about the 
possibility of strategic voting? Posner and Vermeule consider whether the 
risk of strategic voting by judges undercuts the thesis that judicial disagree-
ment is presumptively epistemically significant. Concluding that the answer 
is no, they observe that strategic voting is a “more general” problem “hardly 
unique” to this setting.86 In addition, they reason that reputation is a “major
check” on strategic behavior by judges.87
We agree, but we would go further: The prospect of strategic voting pro-
vides another useful application for our approach, which assigns greater ep-
istemic significance to disagreement with certain friends. We do not limit 
ourselves to the kind of strategic voting that Posner and Vermeule focus 
on—strategic voting made possible by a rule that judges should take the 
votes of other judges into account.88 Instead we have in mind strategic voting 
of a much more banal variety: Voting one way to advance one’s ideological 
interests even though the law, by one’s own lights, compels or at least rec-
ommends an opposite vote. If such ideologically motivated behavior is afoot, 
then the differences between friends and foes become even more im-
portant—though in this application ideological friendship may be more cen-
tral than methodological friendship, to the extent the two diverge. 
Our theory, simply put, is that one is less likely to be misled by strategic 
behavior from one’s ideological friends than one’s ideological foes. Start with 
this: In a given case, an individual judge has special access to whether she is 
voting strategically, i.e., that judge knows whether she is casting her vote in 
bad faith. If a judge is voting strategically, she does not care much whether 
her ideological foe is as well, at least not for epistemic reasons. She is, after 
all, uninterested in “what the law is.”89 Limiting ourselves, then, to cases in 
which a judge is not voting strategically, i.e., is voting in good faith, if the 
judge is voting consistently with her ideology, she has less reason to believe 
that an ideological friend who disagrees with her is voting in bad faith than 
she does an ideological foe. The reason is that, as best she can tell, the ideo-
logical friend is voting against interest and so is unlikely to be voting strate-
gically. By contrast, her ideological foe is voting with interest, making it at 
least plausible that her vote is strategic.90
86. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 183.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 184 (discussing “rational epistemic free riding—acting in such a way that 
puts more of the burden of deciding the case on other, possibly more informed, judges” (foot-
note omitted)).
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
90. We suspect that it is the typical case where a judge takes herself to be voting in a way 
that is at least consistent with her own ideology. Our logic would apply in reverse to the oppo-
site case, where a judge takes herself to be voting contrary to her own ideology (e.g., if her ideo-
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Importantly, this argument does not rest upon the assumption that stra-
tegic voting is widespread.91 Rather, it assumes only that strategic voting oc-
curs with nonzero frequency. The argument has more significant epistemic 
implications, of course, the more frequent one estimates strategic voting to 
be. So long as strategic voting occurs some of the time, however, the argu-
ment entails that judges should take disagreements with their ideological 
friends at least somewhat more seriously.
To be sure, strategic voting suggests increased attention to one’s ideolog-
ical friends rather than one’s methodological friends, to the extent those two 
sets of friends differ. It suggests that conservative textualists might prioritize 
the votes of other conservative textualists more strongly than liberal textual-
ists, and that liberal purposivists might similarly flock together more closely 
than with conservative purposivists. To the extent that methodology corre-
lates with ideology—or to the extent one is using methodology as general 
shorthand for decisionmaking patterns—the role of strategic voting rein-
forces our thesis in a straightforward sense. To the extent one thinks of 
methodology and ideology as distinct and uncorrelated, it instead provides 
another axis on which to refine our theory.
II. Other Friends?
We have so far suggested that it is important to narrow the concept of 
epistemic humility, so that it extends not to all judges but only to one’s
methodological friends. But it may be important to broaden the concept of 
epistemic humility in a different respect. In particular, we see no good rea-
son for a judge’s epistemic peers to be limited to other judges.
Might judges learn not only from the votes of other judges, but also 
from other professionals who have studied the legal question at issue? From 
lawyers who write amicus briefs in the case, from scholars who have written 
commentary, or even from journalists or bloggers who cover the case? Re-
stricting ourselves, as we have argued, to one’s circle of methodological 
friends, why not look to all of one’s friends, and not only the ones who wear 
robes?
Posner and Vermeule briefly flag this point too, asking themselves: 
“Does the relevant information have to come from the votes of other judges,
or will any decision maker do? What about a poll of law professors, practic-
ing lawyers, or people on the street, about whether the statute is clear—
logical friend disagrees with her in such a case, she would have some reason to suspect her 
friend was behaving willfully).
91. As Posner and Vermeule observe, any normative theory of judging must assume 
that “judges are occasionally, but not uniformly, strategic,” the reason being that “[i]f all voting 
is strategic, then it is idle to argue about how judges ‘should’ vote.” Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 1, at 182.
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should the Justices take such information into account?”92 But they never re-
turn to answer their own question. 
Throughout, however, Posner and Vermeule appear to assume that 
judges should look only to other judges, both from the title of their piece and 
from their repetition of “judge” and “colleague” to describe their epistemic 
humility principle. The logic of epistemic humility, we think, points in a dif-
ferent direction.
Posner and Vermeule repeatedly rely on the Condorcet Jury Theorem93
and on the intuition that when “many other people who are presumptively 
reasonable” disagree with you, that should lower your confidence in your 
own views.94 But if so, the insight generalizes off the bench. American judges 
come from long legal careers before they take the bench, as private lawyers 
or government officials or scholars. Their colleagues at their old jobs seem 
likely to be just as reasonable as their new ones—or at least some of them 
will be, and need not be ignored.
The point can be made more formally as well. Recall that the two basic 
proxies for being an “epistemic peer” are that one is “equally rational” and 
that one “have access to the same evidence.”95 There is no reason nonjudicial 
actors cannot meet both of these criteria. 
As we have already suggested, the most important factor when consider-
ing whether one’s peers are “equally rational” is whether they are applying a 
similar framework of reasoning to the problem—i.e., a similar interpretive 
methodology. One need not be a judge to have, or share, a methodology. 
Additionally, lawyers have the same kind of legal education as judges, and 
plenty of them have practical experience, scientific expertise, raw brilliance, 
or whatever virtues one thinks that judges possess. We see no reason to as-
sume the rationality or ability of legal analysts outside the judicial system to 
be unequal to those inside the system.96
As for “access to the same evidence,” one might think that a judge is jus-
tified in assuming that only her colleagues really have the same evidence 
about the case, having read the same briefs and listened to the same argu-
ments by the lawyers. But many other people have access to the briefs and 
oral arguments as well, especially in federal court of appeals cases or Su-
92. Id. at 174.
93. See id. at 177 n.54.
94. See id. at 180.
95. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
96. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1743, 1753 (2013) (“From [the Madisonian] standpoint, the judiciary is just another of 
the branches struggling to encroach upon the others or to aggrandize itself at the expense of 
the others; judges are just part of the invisible-hand system, not some sort of external regulator 
of the system.”); see also id. at 1757–58 (“Judges are inside the political system, not outside it. If 
the system is structured and pervaded by partisan competition . . . then one cannot turn 
around and assume that the judges will be immune.”).
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preme Court cases.97 In a controversial case, there is often no shortage of 
amici and bloggers making their views known on the same evidence that the 
judges are considering. Moreover, if the really important evidence in the case 
is not the filings but the relevant legal materials—the regulation or statute or 
constitutional provision at issue—access is even more widespread. 
Another seemingly formal difference for judges is that they take an oath 
and undertake an obligation to apply the law fairly.98 But even this difference 
does not necessarily support total exclusion of nonjudges. Other government 
officials, and even private lawyers, take an oath as well.99 And in any event, 
the oath goes to one’s obligation to apply the law; it does not magically in-
crease one’s ability to do so. Absent an unusually formalist turn by Posner 
and Vermeule, we doubt that they would argue that the judicial oath or the 
judicial power limits their proposal to judges.
To be sure, there are some reasons that courts are attributed additional 
persuasive authority, but none of those reasons are on point here. For in-
stance, a leading treatment provides:
When does the court of another jurisdiction have authority just by virtue of 
being another court? I isolate three instances: First, when circuit courts cite 
other circuit courts, not merely for their informational or persuasive value, 
but because they seek to avoid a circuit split; second, when state courts aim 
to harmonize their interpretation of state “uniform acts” with other states 
based on the fact that those other states have adopted the same uniform act; 
and third, in common law decisions, when states seek to harmonize their 
doctrines with the judicially crafted doctrines of other states.100
In each of these examples, the ruling of a whole court creates facts on the 
ground with which another court must reckon. But the votes of individual 
judges—before conference and before the court has even ruled—do not have 
the same effect.
Even if there are no formal reasons to sharply exclude nonjudges from 
epistemic humility, there might still be practical ones to give nonjudges less 
weight. One possibility is that nonjudges are more likely to engage in strate-
gic behavior. One’s judicial colleagues, the argument goes, have to be honest 
about how the case should come out, but amici and law professors and jour-
nalists might merely be “working the ref.”101 Again, we are not sure how real 
97. See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 815, 847–48
(2015).
98. See generally Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (2008); Diane P. Wood, 
Reflections on the Judicial Oath, 8 Green Bag 2d 177 (2005).
99. Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 299, 301 n.1 (2016).
100. Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 Okla. L. Rev. 55, 75–
76 (2009).
101. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Essay, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 683, 688–89 (2016) (“Sometimes, there is even ‘working the ref’ before the game is played, 
with blog posts and opinion commentaries. Politicians sometimes do this, journalists do this, 
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this difference is. Once the judicial conciliationist regime is in place, judges 
have plenty of incentive to engage in strategic behavior, as Posner and Ver-
meule recognize.102 Instead, they suggest, judges might “be in a better posi-
tion to gauge confidence levels” of their colleagues than of others.103
Perhaps. But it seems to us that the more important consideration is, as 
we have discussed, that strategic behavior is less of a problem from one’s
methodological and ideological friends.104 Moreover, it is also easier to dis-
cern strategic behavior from one’s friends because one has better access to 
their reasoning process and so a better ability to see if it is plausibly being 
followed.105
A different possibility is that judges and others have different tolerances 
for error because of their different professional goals. After denying that 
judges have any special “expertise” or legal “knowledge,”106 former professor, 
current judge Frank Easterbrook suggested that “good scholars are bolder 
than good judges, and accordingly are wrong more often.”107 We could im-
agine this being manifested in judicial reluctance to consider overly creative 
academic ideas. It would not surprise us if there were more enthusiasm for 
stare decisis among members of the bench than members of the academy. 
On the other hand, we can imagine this effect to be diminished when we 
are specifically asking how scholars would vote to decide a certain case. 
When writing an amicus brief or commenting on a pending case, rather than 
trying to market a new idea, it is not obvious to us that law professors will be 
substantially more “apt to err”108 than any other lawyer or judge of similar 
outlook. (This optimism is of course limited, though, to briefs and commen-
and professors do this. And you see this of course in sports. Coach Mike Krzyzewski, a legend-
ary basketball coach, is pretty good at working the ref during the game. Nothing wrong with 
that for the coaches or advocates. But as judges, we have to tune out the Coach K’s of the legal-
political world who are trying to work the judges.” (footnotes omitted)).
102. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 182–84.
103. Id. at 180.
104. See supra Section I.D.
105. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 773, 
782 (1990) (“Judges apply well only rules that they have internalized.”).
106. Id. at 773–74.
107. Id. at 779; see also id. at 777 (“A free mind is apt to err—most mutations in thought, 
as well as in genes, are neutral or harmful—but because intellectual growth flows from the best 
of today standing on the shoulders of the tallest of yesterday, the failure of most scholars and 
their ideas is unimportant. High risk probably is an essential ingredient of high gain. Academic 
tenure is desired for reasons opposite to that of judicial tenure: scholars have freedom so that 
they may be creative, and in spite of the possibility that tenure may protect routineers who un-
blinkingly do today what was done yesterday.”); id. at 779 (“A high proportion of all ideas is 
unsuccessful (most papers are never cited, even by their authors). A very few scholars, both in 
ages past and today, produce a high percentage of all the ideas we find useful.”).
108. Id. at 777.
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tary that actually reflect scholarly or lawyerly consideration, not just a signa-
ture.)109
Nonetheless, Easterbrook’s hypothesis might be a reason to discount the 
votes of law professors on how a case should come out. On the other hand, 
such votes could still provide valuable information to a methodologically 
friendly jurist. Suppose an originalist judge is trying to consider which of 
various dubious precedents he should devote some energy to overturning. 
The fact that one of the precedents has been singled out as wrong by an 
overwhelming majority of originalists might provide a good reason, all else 
equal, to push that one up in the queue.
In any event, our bottom line is this: we can see some reason to think 
that judges may find more true “friends” on the bench than off of it, but we 
see no good reason to categorically exclude reasonable nonjudges from the 
project of peer disagreement. Indeed, once one recognizes our basic point 
about the logic of looking to methodological friends, the most natural thing 
to do is to look to all of one’s friends, however they are robed.
III. Methodological Friendship in Action
Having discussed the application of peer disagreement to legal interpre-
tation, we now consider what implications our analysis might have if judges 
were to implement it. Though this is our most tentative claim in the Essay, 
we have at least some suspicion that peer disagreement and methodological 
friendship may already be hiding in plain sight.
In rare cases, judges do offer explicit acknowledgment that the votes of 
their colleagues have downgraded their confidence, or even changed their 
mind. For instance, in the 1804 case of Little v. Barreme, which affirmed lia-
bility for an illegal naval seizure, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: 
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion 
that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they 
might yet excuse from damages . . . . But I have been convinced that I was 
mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in that of 
my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of the 
transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have 
been a plain trespass.110
Eighty years later, we can find the United Kingdom’s Lord Blackburn 
acknowledging in a contract case: “I had persuaded myself [of the other side 
of the case, and] had written my reasons for so thinking; but as they were not 
satisfactory to the other noble and learned Lords who heard the case, I do 
not now repeat them nor persist in them. I assent to the judgment proposed, 
109. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Profes-
sor, 4 J. Legal Analysis 223 (2012).
110. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
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though it is not that which I had originally thought proper.”111 And as Pos-
ner and Vermeule point out, in the more modern context we can occasional-
ly find the Supreme Court acknowledging that lower courts’ “differences of 
opinion from our own are substantial enough” to justify qualified immunity 
from damages because they “counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in 
the prior statement of law.”112
But such instances may be most noteworthy for their rarity. Judges do 
not normally tell us how their initial inclinations changed over the course of 
deliberation, only what ended up as their final considered judgment. Nor do 
they specify which of their colleagues’ votes counted the most, or whether all 
had equal weight. Still, we wonder if the overall pattern of judicial behavior 
might reflect the kind of methodological friendship we advocate here.
For instance, it is well-known that the Supreme Court decides many 
high-profile cases by a 5–4 vote, and that in many of those cases the 5–4
votes reflect the same general alignment of justices—Roberts and Alito and 
Thomas and Gorsuch (or their recent predecessors) on one side, and Gins-
burg and Breyer and Sotomayor and Kagan (or their recent predecessors) on 
the other, with Justice Kennedy in between.113 Indeed, empirical research has 
documented this ideological clustering on the Court.114
Moreover, some of the Court’s most controversial 5–4 decisions some-
times give rise to the appearance of influence from outside the Court. On the 
Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,115 Reva Siegel ar-
gues that “[t]he correspondence between the law-and-order Second 
Amendment forged in culture wars of the New Right and the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment that Heller vindicates is striking.”116 The 
Court’s split decision on (and near-invalidation of) the Affordable Care 
Act117 has been said to have been influenced by a small group of legal schol-
ars and bloggers who “present[ed] legal arguments that professionals could 
111. Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 (HL) 622–23 (appeal taken from Eng.).
112. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378–79 (2009). See gener-
ally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 168–73.
113. That is not to say that this is the only important voting pattern in 5–4 cases, see
Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1671, 1673–74 (2016), but it is an overwhelmingly common one, id. at 1677–78.
114. Paul H. Edelman, The Dimension of the Supreme Court, 20 Const. Comment. 557 
(2004); Lawrence Sirovich, A Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme Court, 100 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 7432 (2003); see also Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polarization 
on the United States Supreme Court, 62 Pol. Res. Q. 146 (2009).
115. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
116. Reva B. Siegel, Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism 
in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 239 (2008); see also id. at 240 (“The mobilization of living 
Americans around the text and history of the Second Amendment did more than tutor popular 
and professional intuitions about the amendment’s core and peripheral purposes; it imbued 
the amendment with compelling contemporary social meaning by connecting the right to bear 
arms to some of the most divisive questions of late twentieth-century constitutional politics.”).
117. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (plurality opinion in part).
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take seriously” and were “difficult to dismiss” as ignorant or hacks.118 And 
when invalidating state marriage laws in Obergefell,119 the Court “invoked 
the authority of the many [lower] federal court decisions” that had already 
done so, and “portrayed [them] as having been informed directly or indirect-
ly by the arguments of litigants, lawyers, and society.”120
These results are generally studied as part of the phenomenon of politi-
cal influence on judging, or of the phenomenon of popular constitutional-
ism. Our analysis, however, suggests a different way to think about them.
These patterns of convergence—among like-minded judges and among 
judges and certain allies off the bench—might well be the result of a rational 
approach to epistemic humility. As we have discussed, under the principle of 
epistemic humility, properly understood, we would expect judges to more 
closely match the votes of their methodological friends on the bench. And 
we would also expect them to match, perhaps slightly less closely, the votes 
of their methodological friends off the bench.
While Supreme Court voting blocs are often explained in terms of ideol-
ogy,121 they could well be the result of methodology, especially if methodology 
and ideology are correlated, as they seem to be on today’s Court. Indeed, a 
methodological explanation might actually explain the Court’s most recent 
voting patterns better than an ideological explanation. As Eric Posner has 
noted, in recent years the so-called conservative justices have tended to disa-
gree among themselves more often than the so-called liberal justices.122 And 
118. Ilya Somin, Speech, William Brennan Lecture 2014: NFIB v. Sebelius and the Consti-
tutional Debate over Federalism, 39 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 415, 435–36 (2014); see also Law-
rence Baum, Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 567, 579 
n.81 (2015).
119. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
120. Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 Vand. L. Rev.
1183, 1194 (2017). To be sure, Siegel points out that in fact this legitimation was reciprocal,
since the lower courts were responding to an apparent Supreme Court invitation in United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
121. Clark, supra note 114, at 153 (“A primary finding in the judicial politics literature is 
that judges who have divergent policy preferences are less likely to vote together. These theo-
retical and empirical results highlight ideological disagreement as a primary determinant of 
vote splits among the justices.” (citing Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme 
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002))).
122. Eric Posner, A Fractious Majority: The Supreme Court’s Conservatives Increasingly 
Disagree with One Another, Slate (June 30, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/06/supreme_court_conservatives_disagreements
_make_the_court_more_liberal.html [https://perma.cc/NV23-B7J8]; see also Kedar Bhatia, 
Final October Term 2015 Stat Pack, SCOTUSblog, at 28–30 (June 29, 2016), http://www.scotus
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SB_stat_pack_OT15.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM65-RP
FF].
November 2018] Arguing with Friends 347
a methodological divide among some of the so-called conservatives would 
provide a convincing explanation for why.123
In essence our picture is this: Imagine the Supreme Court hears a case 
about whether some new statute exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers un-
der the Constitution. When the justices reveal their tentative votes to one 
another, Justice Thomas thinks the statute is unconstitutional. If the late Jus-
tice Scalia had been on the fence, he would be more likely to vote to strike 
down the statute. By contrast, Justice Breyer or Justice Ginsburg is unlikely 
to gain any new information from Justice Thomas’s vote because his applica-
tion of his methodology tells them little about theirs. In the very rare cases 
where they think a statute exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers, it will be 
on a different methodological basis. If they take a cue from anybody, it will 
be from more similar justices. And in each of these scenarios, we would ex-
pect the justices to take a challenge to the statute more seriously when law 
professors and amici who share their jurisprudential outlook have endorsed 
the challenge.
That picture, we think, is a quite plausible representation of reality.124
Indeed, to our knowledge the three times Justice Breyer has voted that a 
statute exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers were in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
where he agreed on the result only with Justice Stevens,125 in NFIB v. Sebe-
lius, where his vote was fully shared only with Justice Kagan,126 and very re-
cently in Murphy v. NCAA, where he joined an opinion invalidating a federal 
statute as beyond Congress’s powers, but also a wrote a separate opinion dis-
senting in part and arguing that the challengers’ victory should be “mostly 
Pyrrhic.”127 To our knowledge the only time Justice Ginsburg has voted that 
a statute exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers was in City of Boerne v. 
Flores,128 where she joined a six-justice majority that included Justice Ste-
vens.
So judicial reasoning among epistemic peers may already be in action—
at least in broad strokes. If so, this suggests that what is usually described as 
123. See Posner, supra note 122 (“Another explanation is jurisprudential disagreement. 
Here the division is between formalists (Scalia and Thomas) and pragmatists (Roberts, Alito,
and Kennedy).”).
124. That said, we note that recent work has failed to document a more specific “group 
polarization” or “political polarization” effect, at least at the Supreme Court. See Lee Epstein 
et al., The Behavior of Federal Judges 144–49 (2013).
125. 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522–23 (2012).
127. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1488 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). We put aside a fourth case, Golan v. Holder, in 
which Justice Breyer and Justice Alito would have invalidated a statute under “the Copyright 
Clause, interpreted in the light of the First Amendment,” 565 U.S. 302, 367 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting), since the reasoning did not rest exclusively on enumerated powers grounds.
128. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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immediately political behavior by the Supreme Court may have a more be-
nign,129 or at least more complicated, explanation.
Conclusion
Two heads are better than one, even when they belong to judges. No in-
dividual judge can be sure that she is right about everything, and so she has 
something to learn from judicial disagreement. Judicial conciliationists are 
right to suggest that rational judges ought to take such disagreement into ac-
count, and not always shut out everybody else’s decisions when making their 
own. But their proposal has a great flattening effect, pushing all legal materi-
als toward ambiguity and all judging away from committed methodological 
views. For those with strong methodological commitments, it might seem as 
if the only alternative is to resist them in toto, falling into the solipsistic or 
heroic model of judging.
We take a position that is both more modest and more radical. Judges 
ought to attend to disagreement, but they should not treat all disagreements 
with equal weight. To give all judicial colleagues (and nobody else) equal 
weight is to confuse power with knowledge. In epistemic terms, what matters 
is not power but information—i.e., somebody else’s views tell the judge 
something reliable about his own. Our methodological foes may have much 
to teach us, but not about how confident we should be about individual cas-
es. 
We suspect that many judges already know this, and may already do 
this, even if they would not say so in such exact terms. And if we are right, 
much of what cynics may be tempted to call extralegal decisionmaking really 
is consistent with a rational approach to legal reasoning, among friends.
129. To be sure, one might argue that these methodologies ill serve the justices’ or the 
country’s interests, cf. Posner, supra note 122 (“If this is true, however, conservatives might 
wonder whether they are being well served by their justices. Our society has assigned legislative 
power to the Supreme Court, authorizing it to settle the hardest political questions by fiat. Gay 
marriage and Obamacare are now unshakable political facts in America, and will remain so 
long after the jurisprudential debates among the conservatives have been forgotten”), but we 
leave those debates for another day.
